Abstract: Th e article aims to introduce the selection of systems used throughout the United States of America to appoint or elect state judges. It opens with a brief overview of the federal specifi cs of the courts structure in the USA. Th e federal system of judicial appointment is subsequently described to provide comparative perspective to the state system. Evolution of the state judge selection methods follow, which provides readers with background on the historical development of the subject with emphasis on the political circumstances in particular periods. Next, currently used selection methods are described including the appointment procedures as well as unique partisan and non-partisan judicial elections, and the Missouri Plan based on merit selection. Th e penultimate section contains statistical analysis embracing all fi ft y states and the District of Columbia. Finally, the fi ft h part focuses on two key problems concerning the partisan election method and the response to those problems provided by the United States Supreme Court.
Introduction
Th e federal system of the United States of America is refl ected in the structure of the judiciary. Outside of federal courts there are, in diff erent states, over 50 separate court systems. Individually constructed judiciary systems carry with them signifi cant diff erences not just in their structures but also in the way judges are selected, including the possible use of general elections, where citizens of a given district can themselves decide into whose hands they entrust decision making in disputes arising from the premise of state law.
It is worth highlighting that American judges are not required to undergo any additional training through, e.g. an application, because the graduation certifi cate from a school of law and passing a bar exam in the USA gives them the right to practice in any legal profession 1 . Th e aim of this article is to make the reader acquainted with methods of selecting state judges in the United States, with particular references to the general elections method used, as well as select key issues that had been, more than once, subject to a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Federal judiciary and state judiciary -introduction
Th e United States Constitution, passed in 1787 by the 13 original states, passed the judicial power at the level of the newly established federation to the Supreme Court, and to 'such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish' . (Art. III cl.1). Th e Congress passed the Judiciary Act as early as 1789, thereby establishing federal courts at lower levels. Th ese courts are known as "Article III courts" 2 , and judges presiding over those courts enjoy a life-long term of offi ce and a permanent salary, guaranteed by the provision of the Constitution itself 3 . At the state level the judiciary system is defi ned under appropriate state provisions. A State Constitution usually indicates a basic framework for the functioning of the judicial power and defi nes its structure (as well as general methods for choosing judges), with specifi c measures adopted by state legislature in separate acts 4 . Th e American common law system gives judges wide ranging powers. As a judiciary power, they have control over legislative authority and the executive as part of the system of checks and balances. Th ey have also an opportunity to modify or amplify existing laws and case law, based on legal precedents, is an important source of law in the United States.
Appointment of federal judges
Th e method of appointing the majority of federal judges (Article III judges) is defi ned in the very Constitution of the United States, which delegates this authority to the executive and legislative powers. Under Art. II sec. 2, judges of the Supreme Court of the United States and all lower instance federal courts are appointed by the President of the United States with the advice and the agreement of the Senate. It is worth highlighting that the very same Constitution establishes the life-long term of offi ce for federal judges (Art. III sec.1), with the sole available procedure for recalling a federal judge being through impeachment -a procedure reserved for recalling the President of the USA and federal offi cials (Art. II sec. 4).
Appointment to the offi ce of a federal judge is the most prestigious nomination in USA judiciary. Federal courts are presided over by just under 900 judges 5 . Th e pinnacle of the judiciary career is, of course, the offi ce of a judge of the U.S. Supreme Court, which has nine judges deciding, usually with a lot of media interest, on key issues for American citizens (that is on constitutionality of the provisions of federal and state law), such as single sex marriages 6 , the right to possess weapons 7 or constitutionality of the mandate for a compulsory health insurance 8 .
Evolution of the methods of appointing and electing state judges
Before independence from the British Crown was declared, judges of the American colonies were crown offi cials, imposed from above and, as such, they symbolised dependency and subjugation to the King. In the revolutionary Declaration of Independence of 1776, one of many grievances and symptoms of the tyranny of the King towards the Colony was the judges' full dependence on the royal will (for holding their offi ce and receiving a salary and its amount)
9 . Th erefore aft er passing the Constitution, in the fi rst period of functioning of the United States of America, state judges were mostly appointed by the state's executive authorities and/ . During the presidency of Andrew Jackson (1829-1837), a grass roots demand for the "voice of the people" to be heard in the process of selecting judges appeared in pretty much all states
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. In 1832, Mississippi, as the fi rst state, introduced common elections of judges of all levels as the method of appointment to offi ce. New York joined it in 1846 12 . During the following decades all then existing states and all new states incorporated into the Union, elected their judges, if not altogether than at least in part, through general elections 13 . Parallel to the introduction of this method of choosing judges was the emergence of critical voices which, in time, became much amplifi ed and bolstered by real abuses by judges, contributing to the return of the system of judges being nominated by the executive authority. Th e main reason for the criticism was that the elections were being politicised. In the pioneering states of Mississippi and New York judicial candidates stated their political leanings on the ballot papers, therefore becoming a cog in the political machine which, in turn, meant that they were dependent on political parties and under their supervision. As the result another method appearedjudges being appointed to offi ce following elections, but elections that were apolitical, without political affi liations stated on the ballot papers 14 . Already at the beginning of the 20 th century, many lawyers, including the former US president William Howard Taft , strongly voiced the need for changes and categorically regarded partisan election of judges as a mark of disrespect for the justice system. In 1913 Albert M. Kales of Northwestern University founded the American Judicature Society and began working on a new method of selecting state judges, which was to include elements of electoral procedure, nomination and a competency-based assessment of individual candidates by independent commissions. Templates for this method for selecting judges were modifi ed over the years, until in 1937 the American Bar Association presented the fi nal version of non-partisan, competence based method for the selection of state judges, the so called Th e fi rst state to deploy this method in practice was Missouri, where in 1940 a constitutional amendment was adopted, introducing the Nonpartisan Court Plan. According to the new legislation, the selection of judges was subject to extraordinary procedure in several phases. First, an independent commission composed of citizens -lawyers and laymen -assessed potential candidates for judges, selecting the winners of this stage and presenting them to the state governor. Th e governor would make the fi nal choice of a judge and appoint them to a specifi c post, usually for the period on one year. Aft er that time the so called retention elections took place where local voters in general elections decided on whether the judge should retain or leave his post 16 . Such method of choosing judges proved hugely successful and soon the Missouri Plan was being implemented in other states in a more or less modifi ed format. Nowadays this system is statistically the most frequently used selection method for judges in the majority of US states (see data in the later part of this article).
Contemporary methods of appointing and electing state judges
Nowadays state judges are elected or nominated in a variety of ways, in diff erent states. Along with those representing the American doctrine, it is possible to surmise that the 50 states and the District of Columbia apply a curious patchwork of election and appointment methods for selecting state judges 17 . Generally, three methods are used, shaped by the process described above: 1. Th e procedure of appointing judges, which includes an executive appointment by the state governor, and the procedure of appointment by the legislative authority, that is through voting by the state legislature. 2. General elections, with two electoral systems: partisan elections where judges are elected in party political elections (in order to stand, candidates need to win in primary elections), where the electorate for a given area has a vote; and non-partisan elections, where judges are voted in by the electorate of a given area but their names on the ballot papers are not accompanied by the information on their political affi liation (in this system, candidates for judges also go through party primary elections, but in the end voters are not made aware of their political party membership). 3. Merit Selection also known as the Missouri Plan, or committee nomination, is, generally speaking, based on candidates for judges being chosen through a special procedure (with a number of potential variants) by legislative committees based on their track record and competency criteria. Statistically the most frequently used method for choosing state judges is the Missouri Plan. In 15 states and in the District of Columbia the plan is used to select judges to all courts. In 9 other states Merit Selection is used to choose judges of the courts of appeal, with judges of the lower instance courts being chosen through general elections (partisan or non-partisan). In total, 24 states deploy this method and in nine others the Missouri Plan is used to a symbolic degree (but it is still used) in the case of by-elections on some judiciary levels. Th e next largest group (15) are states where the choice of judges is through general non-partisan elections. Partisan elections of judges take place in only six states. In the smallest group, of only fi ve states, judges are appointed by the governor (three states), or the state legislature (two states)
19
. When the above statistics are overlaid on the map of the United States, strong divisions are not diffi cult to spot. All the northern states, from Michigan to Washington and even Oregon, have adopted the method of non-partisan elections of judges to offi ce. Th ey were joined by some south eastern states -Arkansas, Georgia or Mississippi, faithful to its original objectives). Partisan elections are the dominant method of selecting judges in three states in the middle east of the country (Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania) and in the three typically southern states (Texas, Louisiana and Alabama). Th e middle states (from Wyoming, Utah and Arizona as far as Iowa and Tennessee) have adopted the Missouri Plan -wholly or partially. It is worth adding that the Missouri Plan nowadays uses a mixed system, with partisan elections used to fi ll judges' offi ces in some courts. Th is group of states was joined by geographically distant New York, Florida, the majority of the small states of the east coast (e.g. Massachusetts, Vermont, Rhode Island) and the District of Columbia, as well as Hawaii and Alaska. . What is interesting is that this division does not exactly correlate with the traditional divisions between Republican and Democrat states in terms of electoral preferences of their residents. Partisan elections of judges are used in the three traditionally Republican states -Texas, Louisiana and Alabama -and three Democratic states -Illinois, Ohio or Pennsylvania. Th e common political denomination is only present in those states who retained the executive appointment of judges or appointment by the legislature, although even here, among the 'blue' Democrat-voting states, there is the splinter state of the republican South Carolina.
Controversies surrounding elections to the offi ce of judge in the United States in the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States
Th e deployment of the general elections method, especially partisan elections, either as the basic method of or as part of the Merit Selection, fuels the discussion (from the very start) over the dangers of such mechanisms and the exchange of arguments between its vehement critics and staunch supporters. Th e key issues here reached the Supreme Court of the United States, whose judges have the fi nal say about compatibility of American law with the Federal Constitution.
Th e issue of politicising the elections campaign and its fi nancing seems to encompass most controversies over the general elections to judicial offi ces.
Making the political sympathies or the convictions of the judicial candidates public is, on one hand, treated as the right of society to have access to information on the fundamental values the candidates subscribe to; on the other hand, it seems to contravene the idea of independence of the judicial authority. Mounting regular election campaigns by judicial candidates (including top level offi ces within the state authority, such as the president of the state supreme court) requires signifi cant funds which can amount to huge expenditure sums of several million dollars in the course of one campaign
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. Qualitative and quantitative studies carried out by independent bodies and academics indicate that the majority of voters (76%) legislation in force in Minnesota, which prevents judicial candidates from disclosing their political preferences, is incompatible with the United States Constitution as it contravenes the First Amendment and the right to free speech contained therein. Th is has strengthened the free hand of candidates to make use of political emotion in campaigns for judicial offi ces. Th e fi nancing of judicial campaigns was signifi cantly impacted by the last of well publicised decrees in 2010, where (with a 5:4 majority) the Supreme Court found that in the context of elections, there is no diff erence in the freedoms arising from the First Amendment between physical persons and companies, and the latter have a right to unlimited political and campaign expenditure, which do not amount to an element of corruption
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. Th e judges of the Supreme Court had also spoken on the matter of the interrelationship between a donor fi nancing a judiciary elections campaign (for a record amount of over $3 million) and the judge taking part in a case where the benefactor is one of the parties. With a 5:4 decision, the Supreme Court declared that such support may lead to an extreme partiality
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. Th e latest decree in the above area was issued in April 2015 in the case of WilliamsYulee v. Th e Florida Bar. With another 5:4 decision, the Florida State legislation, which prohibited candidates from personally applying for campaign funding, was upheld as not contrary to the First Amendment
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. It needs to be highlighted that in all the above cases the decisions were made with the majority of just one vote, therefore the 'supreme' judges themselves did not have a uniform stance on the issue. What is interesting, winners in campaigns for top state judiciary offi ces (for example the fi rst woman to lead the Supreme Court of Alabama in history -Sue Bell Cobb), as well as the retired judge of the Supreme Court itselfSandra O'Connor -have consistently argued over the years for a reform necessary to prevent such abuses and proposed abandoning the general elections method (especially partisan) for fi lling judiciary offi ces, which in turn has been met with staunch opposition from their supporters A decision by the Supreme Court that this method is not constitutional seems the only eff ective way to remove these problematic procedures. However, considering the historic factors behind the election of judges, American society's involvement in political life and elections, and the simple fact that most states regard this method as the best, such a decision by the Supreme Court at this stage would seem impossible.
